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Abstract
Does comparative advantage explain legislators’ support for trade liberalization? We use data on
potential crop yields as determined by weather and soil characteristics to derive a new, plausibly
exogenous measure of comparative advantage in agriculture for each district in the US. Evidence
shows that comparative advantage in agriculture predicts how legislators vote on the ratification
of preferential trade agreements in Congress. We show that legislators in districts with high
agricultural comparative advantage are more likely to mention that trade agreements are good
for agriculture in House floor debates preceding roll-call votes on their ratifications. Individuals
living in the same districts are also more likely to support free trade. Our analysis and results
contribute to the literature on the political economy of trade and its distributional consequences,
and to our understanding of the economic determinants of legislators voting decisions.
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Does comparative advantage explain legislators support for trade liberalization? According to
classical trade theory, in free trade, countries export or import goods depending on their relative
efficiency in producing them. Removing trade tariffs increases the demand for final goods in ex-
porting industries, increasing employment and wages, while it has the opposite effect on importing
industries. It follows that comparative advantage shapes the distributional consequences of trade
liberalization, but does it explain the extent of political support for it?
There is a large stream of research exploring the determinants of legislators voting in the US
(Baldwin and Magee 2000; Karol 2007; Milner and Tingley 2011). The seminal work of Hiscox
(2001, 2002) shows that the level of land, labor, and capital mobility across industries shapes
trade policy coalitions. More recently, Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) have shown that legislators in
areas heavily affected by import penetration from China are less likely to vote in favor of trade
liberalization. Relatedly, Owen (2017) shows that legislators from districts with a high presence
of offshorable jobs are more likely to oppose preferential trade agreements (PTAs) than legislators
from districts with a low presence of offshorable jobs.
While trade theory based on comparative advantage is simple and undisputed (see for instance
Costinot and Donaldson 2012), estimating the causal effect of comparative advantage on support
for specific policies fostering trade liberalization is not. The observed distribution of economic
activity across areas and sectors is shaped by different factors, including the policy preferences of
elected officials and voters. Exploiting information on exports, value added, or employment across
sectors to measure comparative advantage and relating it to support for trade liberalization may be
misleading, as variation in all such observables may be driven by the same underlying distribution
of policy preferences, even in the absence of a causal link between them.
As an example, consider a legislator who has strong preferences in favor of trade liberalization
and is also committed to defend the interests of agricultural producers in her district. On the one
hand, following her preferences, the legislator would vote in favor of PTAs. On the other hand, this
same legislator would implement policies state guaranteed loans, input price subsidies, etc. that
boost the productivity of the agricultural sector relative to the manufacturing sector, increasing
comparative advantage in agriculture. In this case, agricultural comparative advantage and PTA
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voting behavior would be systematically related via legislators preferences and policy actions, even
in the absence of a causal relationship between the two.
In this paper, we use data on the suitability of soil to produce different crops to build a new,
exogenous measure of comparative advantage in agriculture. We rely on estimates of potential crop
yields from the Food and Agriculture Organizations (FAO) Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ)
database. These yields are calculated by incorporating local soil and weather characteristics into
a model that predicts the maximum attainable yields for each crop in a given district. As such,
potential yields are an ideal source of exogenous variation in agricultural productivity because they
are independent of actual yields from cultivated crops and their determinants, including policy
driven ones.
We use this exogenous measure of comparative advantage to explore its effect on US legislators
voting on the most important pieces of trade liberalization since the 1990s: PTAs. We find that
comparative advantage in agriculture has a strong positive effect on legislators voting in favor
of PTAs. Our results are robust to different operationalizations of our measure of comparative
advantage and different model specifications. In particular, we construct two other measures of
comparative advantage in which we include also information on the manufacturing sector. In
an effort to explore the underlying mechanisms, we show that legislators in districts with high
comparative advantages in agriculture are more likely to mention that PTAs are good for farmers
in House floor debates preceding the vote on the bills. Moreover, survey data on individual attitudes
on free trade confirm the role of comparative advantages in agriculture.
This paper makes two contributions. First, our findings indicate that legislators votes on PTAs
are in line with the expected economic gains in their own districts: The larger a district’s com-
parative advantage in agriculture, the higher the probability that its legislator will support trade
liberalization. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis to show the causal effect of
comparative advantage in agriculture on legislators support for free trade, casting doubt on the
conventional wisdom that US interest groups in agriculture are typically against trade liberalization
(Davis 2004). Second, our results document the potential positive role of agriculture in determining
trade policy and enhancing free trade. These findings complement recent studies that have shown
increasing opposition to trade in the US and other developed economies, especially by manufac-
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turing workers (Feigenbaum and Hall 2015; Colantone and Stanig 2018). In this sense, our results
speak to another milestone in trade theory, namely that trade creates winners and losers. The
evidence in this paper shows that legislators behave accordingly.
Data
Measuring comparative advantage We construct our measure of comparative advantage in
agriculture by combining estimates of potential crop yields across US districts and partner countries
from the FAOs GAEZ database with data on PTA agreements from the DESTA dataset. For each
US district and PTA, we take the sum of crop suitability across all the crops included in the PTA
and divide it by the population of the district at the baseline .1 This gives us a district-level measure
of overall potential efficiency in producing the agricultural goods included in the PTA. This is also
a measure of the relative efficiency in producing these goods insofar as efficiency in producing
any other good has limited variation across districts.2 Then, we compute the same measure for
the partner country: We sum crop suitability across all the crops included in the PTA, again
standardized by the partner countrys population. Given empirical evidence documenting that non-
agricultural productivity varies less than agricultural productivity across countries (Gollin et al.
2014), we interpret the ratio between these two quantities as a measure of the districts comparative
advantage in agriculture with respect to the partner country.3 We label this measure Agri CA.
We derive this measure using information on potential yields in agriculture as determined by
geographic characteristics. As such, it abstracts from any observed and unobserved district-level
characteristics that are possibly influenced by policy preferences, and is therefore exogenous. How-
ever, its interpretation as measure of agricultural comparative advantage hinges on the assumption
of limited variation in the productivity of non-agriculture across US districts and partner countries.
To further validate our results, we construct two additional measures of comparative advantage.
These measures are built using information on actual agricultural and manufacturing production in
US districts and partner countries. As a result, their interpretation does not rely on any assumption
1We use Baccini et al.s (2018) data on preferential tariffs to identify the crops included in each agreement. Crops
with zero MFN tariffs or which are not included in the PTA are excluded.
2In this case, comparative and absolute advantage in agriculture are positively correlated (Roy 1951).
3Appendix A provides a detailed description of how the comparative advantage measure is constructed.
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on the distribution of the relative agricultural and manufacturing productivity. This comes at the
cost of them being potentially endogenous.
To construct these measures, we first derive a measure of relative productivity in manufacturing.
We weight US total export in each manufacturing industry included in each PTA by the baseline
share of workers in the same industry in each US district, then sum these values across all manu-
facturing industries for each district. We divide this measure by US partners total manufacturing
exports weighted by the sectors GDP.4 We then divide our initial measure of efficiency in agricul-
ture based on potential yields by this revealed measure of efficiency in manufacturing. We label
this measure Agri CA1. Finally, we build a third measure where we replace weighted exports in
agriculture calculated as just explained for manufacturing for the suitability-based measure above,
again divided by their homologue for manufacturing. We label this third measure Agri CA2.5
All these measures of comparative advantage are continuous. Values above one imply that US
district d has a comparative advantage in agriculture over partner country p in producing the
agricultural goods included in the PTA. The three measures differ in the extent to which they rely
on actual exports data and thus their level of endogeneity, with Agri CA being the most exogenous.
All measures vary across districts depending on their suitability to produce different crops and
their assumed or actual productivity in manufacturing. In addition, they also vary according to
the partner country, its suitability to produce different crops and its assumed or actual productivity
in manufacturing, and the set of goods that are affected by the PTA.
We validate these measures in different ways, as reported in Appendix B. To validate Agri CA,
we show that (i) non-agricultural productivity varies less than agricultural productivity across US
districts and across countries, and that (ii) it correlates with the other measures. We also show that
the measure behaves as expected in that (iii) US districts overall have a comparative advantage
in agriculture with countries like Bahrain, Oman, and Singapore, and that (iv) its geographical
variation across US districts is in line with the actual production capabilities of different parts of
the country.
4Details on the exact construction of this variable are also provided in Appendix A.
5We take the log of all these variables to mitigate the impact of outliers.
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Legislators Votes on Trade Agreements The outcome variable considers the roll call votes
on the ratification of 12 free trade agreements implemented between 1993 and 2011 (from the 103rd
US Congress to the 112th US Congress). Some PTAs involve more than one partner country (e.g.
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)), so that we end up with a total of 18 partner
countries. We thus cover the entire universe of US PTAs currently in force except for two PTAs
implemented in the 1980s (with Israel and Canada) and the Jordan-US trade agreement, the votes
for which were not recorded. Our main analysis focuses on the House of Representatives, which
allows us to consider district-level characteristics. The data come from GovTrack (2018).6
Figures B7 and B8 in Appendix B show the share of yes votes for each PTA signed by the US
by partner country and the geographical distribution of the share of yes votes for all the PTAs
across US districts, respectively. As expected, PTAs seem to face the greatest political resistance
in heavy manufacturing districts and with countries posing concrete risks of delocalization.
Identification Strategy
Our main model specification is the following:
V otedp = αd + γt + β0 + β1Agri CAdp + β2Democratsdp + β3Offshorabledp + ǫdp, (1)
where V otedp is a dummy equal to one if the legislator from district d votes in favor of ratifying
the PTA with partner country p, and zero otherwise. Agri CAdp is our measure of agricultural
comparative advantage of district d with respect to partner country p. αd are district fixed effects,
which control for and net out time-invariant differences across districts, and γt are decade fixed
effects, which absorb the overall trends in legislators votes. Note that because Agri CAdp is specific
to each district and partner country, we use variation both across districts and within districts across
PTAs to identify the parameter of interest β1.
We also include two control variables that have been proven important in previous studies: (i)
a dummy scoring one if the legislator is a Democrat (Feigenbaum and Hall 2015), and (ii) the
6Senators do not belong to specific districts. We implement this analysis at the state level. We report the
corresponding results in Appendix D.
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percentage of workers in the congressional district in offshorable occupations (Owen, 2017).7 We
label these controls together as Main Controls. In the most saturated specification, we also include
manufacturing employment, manufacturing profits, agriculture employment, population density,
and a weighted measure of manufacturing trade balance with partner countries, labeling these
variables altogether as Additional Controls. We obtain coefficient estimates using Ordinary Least
Squares regressions (OLS) in order to avoid the incidental parameter problem, which is caused by
the presence as in our case of a large set of fixed effects. We allow the residual determinants of
voting behavior to be correlated within districts across PTA votes by clustering standard errors at
that same level, i.e. at the district level.
Results
Table 1 shows the results of our main analysis. Model 1 is the backbone model with no fixed effects
and no controls, Model 2 includes district fixed effects, and Model 3 includes both district and
decade fixed effects. Models 4 and 5 further include the Main Controls and Additional Controls
respectively. The coefficient of Agri CA is positive and significant at the 1% level across all specifi-
cations. In Models 6 and 7, we replace the main Agri CA measure with the more endogenous Agri
CA1 and Agri CA2 measures. The coefficient of interest remains positive and highly significant.
The magnitude of the estimated effect is meaningful. Moving the value of Agri CA from the
value of the lower quartile (US vs. Canada) to the value of the upper quartile (US vs. South
Korea) increases legislators probability to vote in favor of PTAs by (at least) 10%. In the House
of Representatives, NAFTA and Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement were
approved with 3.9% and 0.2% margins, respectively. These findings indicate that US districts
comparative advantages in agriculture vis-a´-vis partner countries have a large causal effect on
legislators probability to support PTAs. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is larger for Agri
CA than for Agri CA1 and Agri CA2. This is particularly evident with the most endogenous
measure, Agri CA2: The magnitude is more than halved compared to our preferred exogenous
measure, Agri CA. This indicates that using endogenous measures of comparative advantage would
underestimate its effect on the politics of PTAs.
7We extend the measure created by Owen (2017) to cover the whole period of our analysis.
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Table 1: Comparative Advantage in Agriculture and Legislators Votes on PTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agri CA 0.034*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015***





Constant 0.565*** 0.953*** 0.933*** 1.007*** 1.038*** 0.937*** 1.007***
(0.017) (0.005) (0.022) (0.033) (0.271) (0.034) (0.033)
Pr[p(75)]/Pr[p(25)] 22% 11% 10% 10% 10% 9% 4%
Observations 7,708 7,708 7,708 7,520 6,543 7,397 7,346
R-squared 0.045 0.557 0.560 0.595 0.647 0.600 0.596
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No Yes No No
OLS
Legislators' Voting in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation
is the district-partner country. The key independent variable are measures of comparative advantage,
which vary by district and partner country. Source: FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, and IPUMS.
We now turn to investigate the mechanisms at play.8 We use text analysis to record all statements
related to agriculture in speeches given by legislators in House floor debates preceding roll-call votes
on PTAs. We then manually code whether legislators mentioned that PTAs bring benefits to the
agricultural sector, and normalize this count variable by the full length of the speech. We replace
this as dependent variable in our main model specification. Table 2 reports the corresponding
coefficient estimates. Estimates from Models 1 to 3 show that agricultural comparative advantage
increases the probability that legislators mention the PTA benefits for the agricultural sector.
Also in this case, the magnitude of the effect is the largest when using our exogenous measure of
comparative advantage, namely Agri CA.
8More details on this part of the analysis are provided in Appendix C.
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Table 2: Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agri CA 0.0002** 0.0280**
(0.000) (0.011)
Agri CA1 0.0001*** 0.0296**
(0.000) (0.011)
Agri CA2 0.0002*** 0.0069
(0.000) (0.007)
Constant 0.0037** 0.0032* 0.0038** 1.2621*** 1.0794*** 1.2730***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.053) (0.098) (0.053)
Pr[p(75)]/Pr[p(25)] 94% 62% 80% 7% 7% 2%
Observations 840 826 825 5,548 5,548 5,548
R-squared 0.063 0.059 0.061 0.167 0.167 0.167
District FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
OLS
PTAs Good for Agric. Support For Free Trade
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation
is the district-partner country (Models 1-3) and individual-district-wave (Models 4-6). The key
independent variable is a measure of comparative advantage, which varies by district and partner
country (Models 1-3) and by district and wave (Models 4-6). Source: ANES, FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack,
and IPUMS.
Finally, we explore the effect of agricultural comparative advantage on individuals attitudes
towards free trade. We use data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) survey and
build a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent supports free trade. We replace this as main
dependent variable in our main specification, including the Main Controls and a set of individual
level controls (age, education, gender, and ideology) in addition to district and ANES wave fixed
effects. Estimates from Models 4 to 6 show that the coefficient of Agri CA and Agri CA1 is positive
and significant, whereas the coefficient of Agri CA2 is positive but not significant, confirming once
again the importance of relying on an exogenous measure of comparative advantage.
Appendix D reports a number of additional tests, e.g. alternative measures of comparative
advantage, logit regressions, accounting for the China Shock. Our results are unchanged.
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Conclusion
Comparative advantage is one of the oldest theories in economics. Empirical tests on the validity
of the theory in explaining trade policy abound. However, many of these analyses do not go
beyond simple correlation due to the presence of confounding factors, and more generally due to
the complex relation between economics and politics. We have provided evidence that comparative
advantage in agriculture has a causal effect on support for PTAs. Legislators from US districts
with a greater comparative advantage in agriculture vis-a´-vis their trade partners are more likely
to vote yes to PTAs than US districts with a lower agricultural comparative advantage. In short,
evidence shows that comparative advantage is alive and well: Politicians respond to pieces of trade
policy consistently with the predictions of simple economic theory.
Our findings also indicate that the US agricultural sector is a key driver of preferential trade
liberalization. This result is at odds with conventional wisdom, which sees agriculture as a heavily
protectionist sector in developed economies. Indeed, most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs in agricul-
ture remain significantly higher than MFN tariffs in manufacturing, a fact for which the European
Union, the US, and Japan are often blamed. Our analysis indicates that US districts with greater
comparative advantages in agriculture than their trade partners push convincingly for the ratifica-
tion of PTAs. The reason for this support for trade liberalization is simple: Districts with a higher
comparative advantage in agriculture have larger expected gains from trade.
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Measuring Comparative Advantage in Agriculture: Technical Note
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the methodology used to construct our main
measure of comparative advantage AgriCA.
Data
Our analysis combines different datasets. The first database is the Global Agro-Ecological Zones
(GAEZ) dataset provided by food and agriculture organizations (FAO). The dataset provides the
global crop suitability index and production yields for 48 crops at the level of high-resolution
grid cells covering the entire surface of the Earth. The suitability index and estimated yields are
constructed using agronomic models and data on geographic characteristics such as soil, topography,
elevation, and climatic conditions. Suitability is then differentiated according to the cost of inputs
necessary to produce a given crop. This results in three different global crop suitability indexes
and potential yields datasets for crops that require a high amount of input costs, an intermediate
amount of input costs, and a low amount of input costs. For each of these crop input cost levels,
there are crop-specific measures (e.g. different global crop suitability levels for alfalfa vs. corn).
These data have been already used in influential studies in economics (Costinot et al. 2016; Bustos
et al. 2016).
The second database is DESTA, which is an original dataset containing the tariff concessions
made by trading entities in more than 60 North-South PTAs signed after 1995. Importantly for
this study, the sample includes all the PTAs formed by the United States. The dataset includes
tariff schedules from the officially negotiated tariff schedules listed in the appendices of the PTAs.
All PTAs contain two tariff schedules, one for the US vis--vis partner country, and one partner
country vis--vis the US. Tariff data are highly disaggregated, namely at the Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System (HS) 6-digit level. At this level, we find tariffs for each crop
included in the analysis. The dataset is part of the Desta project (Dr et al. 2014 available at
http://www.designoftradeagreements.org/).
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The third dataset is the legislative data records for select preferential trade agreement (PTA)
legislature, which was gathered from GovTrack (www.govtrack.us/congress/votes). This data was
split into Senate and House voting records. Because only House votes are of interest (as Senators
have no electoral geography), Senate votes are not considered in our analysis.
Main Measure of Agricultural Comparative Advantage: AgriCA
The main explanatory variable in our analysis is AgriCAdp, which is the agricultural comparative
advantage of district d with respect to country p. This is a district-partner country specific measure.
To construct this measure we combine information from both the US districts and the partner
countries in each PTA. As a first step, for each US district, we take the sum (and the mean) of the
suitability for all the crops facing a tariff reduction as a result of a PTA between the US and the
partner country.9 This variable is then standardized by dividing it by the district total population







where Ad(p) is district d per-capita agricultural suitability with respect to country p, computed as
the sum of suitability for crop c in district d (suitcd) for all crops c included in the list Cp of the
crops for which the PTA between the US and the country p implies a tariff reduction, divided by
the district population at the baseline.10 Our notation emphasizes that our measure of agricultural
suitability for district d is partner country (and implicitly PTA) specific. This is because each PTA
may include a different subset of crops and thus a different level of comparative advantage for the
same district with respect to different partner countries.
Next, for each partner country (and thus each PTA), we take the sum (and the mean) of the
suitability for all the crops facing a tariff reduction as a result of a PTA between the country and








9To identify for each PTA which crops are subject to tariffs cuts we use the DESTA dataset (Baccini et al. 2018).
10When 1990 population values are not available for some districts, which were not formed until after 1990, the
next available decennial population value is used.
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where Ap is partner country p per-capita agricultural suitability, computed as the sum of suitability
for crop c in country p (suitcp) for all crops c included in the list Cp of the crops for which the
PTA between the US and the country p implies a tariff reduction, divided by country population
at baseline.
The ratio between these two measures of agricultural productivity gives us the relative agri-
cultural productivity of district d in the US with respect to country p, for crops that face tariff





By definition, district d has a comparative advantage with respect to country p in producing













whereA andM are measures of production efficiency respectively in agricultural and non-agricultural
goods. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, it is not possible to directly observe Md(p) and Mp.
Yet, two observations can be useful to relate Ψdp to comparative advantage in agricultural produc-
tion for district d with respect to country p. First, while Ad is a measure of absolute agricultural
efficiency in district d, it can be interpreted as a measure of relative efficiency in producing agricul-
tural crops with respect to other goods in district d insofar as efficiency in producing any other good
(i.e. Md(p)) has limited variation across districts. Indeed, in this case comparative and absolute
advantage in producing the agricultural goods included in the PTA are positively correlated (Roy
1951). Second, the direction of the comparative advantage for district d with respect to country p
crucially depends on the term Mp, i.e. country p productivity in non-agricultural sectors. While it
is not possible to directly estimate Md(p), there is consistent empirical evidence documenting that
productivity of non-agricultural goods varies less than productivity of agriculture across countries.
It follows that the higher the Ψdp, the more likely it is that district d has a comparative advantage
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in agriculture with respect to country p. Based on these observations, we finally define:





= log(Ad(p))− log(Ap) (5)
where we choose to use the natural logarithm of Ψdp (adding 0.0001 to avoid losing the 0 values)
because its distribution is heavily skewed on the left. In any case, no one of our results is sensitive
to this transformation.
We also generated non-population standardized versions of the above variable as well as a mea-
sure of comparative advantage for these crops excluded by PTAs, which we use as a placebo.
Alternative Measures of Agricultural Comparative Advantage: AgriCA1 and AgriCA2
First, we collect commodity-level trade data between the US and its PTA partners. For the partners,
the data comes from UN Comtrade. For each partner country and good at the HS 6-digit level,
we have exports to the United States and to the world. For the US, this data comes from the
US Census Bureau via Peter K. Schott. This is at the HS 10-digit level, and we have exports
to each partner and to the world. The data is downloaded from Comtrades API in the R script
comtrade dl.r, while us trade.r processes Schotts data.
We also match these product codes to NAICS industry codes. Schotts data are already matched
to NAICS codes using his concordance, with one-to-one relationships between NAICS 6-digit codes
and HS 10-digit commodities. To merge the partner trade data, we use In Song Kims concordance()
package, which uses Schotts crosswalk. Because the crosswalk is at the HS-10 level, there is a
one-to-many relationship between HS-6 commodities and NAICS industry codes. Where multiple
industries merge, we evenly divide trade flows between them. This is done in the script trade naics.r.
Tariffs In trade desta.r we then combine partner trade data and US trade data at the HS 6-
digit level. Because there are sometimes multiple industries for each commodity, this is at the
commodity-industry level, though the majority of HS 6-digit commodities merge with only one
NAICS industry. With the trade data complete, we then merge on tariffs. Most of these are
available in the DESTA dataset. Because NAFTA is not included, tariffs at HS-6 for Canada and
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Mexico are downloaded from the UN TRAINS database and assembled in trains.r, before being
added to the DESTA tariff data. After merging trade with DESTA and NAFTA tariffs, we create
two measures of trade: one which is the average of exports of that good for three years before PTA
ratification, and one for five years. This includes the year of ratification, so for NAFTA, which was
ratified in 1994, this is ((x 1992 + x 1993 + x 1994) / 3).
We identify four sets of products: products where MFN is zero and PRF is zero (MFN zero),
products where PRF is zero and MFN is positive (PRF zero), products where MFN is positive and
there is a positive PRF rate (PRF positive), and products which are excluded from the agreement
(Excluded). We group PRF zero and PRF positive in the category Included. We use PRF rates
from t0 in DESTA, while the available NAFTA rates are from 1995.
Employment Data We then need to connect these to regional employment data. To construct
this we draw on two sources: the County Business Patterns (CBP) and the Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages (QCEW). In general, the CBP are more complete, so these are our base.
We have county-level employment in nearly all NAICS industries. However, the CBP omit farm
activity within NAICS codes 111 and 112, which is where most crop production falls. Luckily, these
are within the QCEW, so we isolate these industries and add them to the CBP data to create a
complete employment profile for each county. Note that about half of the time the QCEW omits
6-digit employment for confidentiality reasons. However, we stick with this because it does not
improve at more aggregate levels.
Coverage improves significantly in 2001 and 2002 compared to earlier years, so we use em-
ployment from 2002, which is a Census of Agriculture year. Because resulting data must be for
congressional districts, not counties, we use a crosswalk to districts from the 108th Congress from
geocorr, a tool hosted by the University of Missouri. These districts are based on the 2000 census
and are unchanged from the 107th Congress. This is all done in us emp.r.
Manufacturing Efficiency of US Districts We then measure the overall efficiency in manu-
facturing. This is done in cd trade.r. First, we compute the baseline share of national employment
in each industry which is within each district. We merge on trade data by industry, so that for each
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county-industry we have exports from the US to the world. We have this measure as the 3-year and
5-year averages, and the below applies to both. We use the 5-year average for the main analysis.11
We then multiply the employment share by exports to each partner to calculate that congres-
sional districts exposure to exports in that industry to that partner. In the data, this is named
cd export dollars ... We build this for three categories of goods: Manufacturing (NAICS 31-33),
Agriculture (NAICS 11), and Crops (a subset of NAICS 11 based on the crops in the suitability
measure this is done separately in cd trade crops.r and then merged in). Within each of these
groups, we construct the measure separately for the four sets of products based on tariffs identified
above.
We also construct the same measure with respect to the world, i.e. considering exports to the
rest of the world as a whole. Here we do the same as above, but instead multiply the employment
share by total exports in that industry to the world. In the measures datasets, these are named
either cd export dollars (bilateral) or cd world export dollars (absolute).
In the main analysis, we focus on 5-year average manufacturing exports from the US to the world
weighted on employment share in the same manufacturing industries. We sum all manufacturing
industries in each district. We label this measure XMANU . This is equivalent to Md(p) in equation
4.
Manufacturing Efficiency of Partner Countries For the denominator of the measure, we
start with data on GDP shares for each partner country. These are from the WDI, which we
organize in wdi.r. GDP shares are very aggregate, available for manufacturing and the entire
NAICS 11 (Forestry, Fishing, and Agriculture). The data are often incomplete, so we use GDP
shares from 1998, the earliest year where we have each country, other than Bahrain. For Bahrain
we use shares from 2002, when that indicator becomes available.
For each of the groupings described above (Agri, Manu, Crops, each divided into the four types
of groups) we multiple partner exports by this share. This is done once using bilateral exports from
the partner to the United States, and once using total exports from the partner to the world in
that industry. Again, this is done using both 3- and 5-year averages, within cd trade.r.
11Results are virtually the same if we rely on the 3-year average (available upon request).
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In the main analysis, we focus on 5-year average manufacturing exports from partner countries
to the world weighted on manufacturing GDP. This variable is aggregated at the country level. We
label this measure ZMANU . This is equivalent to Mp in equation 4.
Agri CA1 The measure of manufacturing efficiency is created by dividing XMANU by ZMANU .











Note that Agri CA is already a log and so the difference between two log variables is equivalent to
the ratio of their raw value.
Agri CA2 We follow similar steps to build Agri CA2. We take the 5-year average agricultural
exports from the US to the world weighted on employment share in the same agricultural industries.
We sum all agricultural industries in each district. We label this measure XAGRI . This is equivalent
to Ad(p) in equation 4. Moreover, we take the 5-year average agricultural exports from partner
countries to the world weighted on agricultural GDP. This variable is aggregated at the country
level. We label this measure ZAGRI . This is equivalent to Ap in equation 4.
The measure of agricultural efficiency is created by dividing XAGRI by ZAGRI . Then we take
















Manufacturing Trade Balance To build our measure of manufacturing trade balance, we rely
on 5-year average trade balance in manufacturing between the US and partner countries. We weight
this measure by employment share in the same manufacturing industry and we sum these values
across districts.
Finally, we note that our results are very similar if we rely on 3-year average values. Moreover,
we obtain similar results if we rely on bilateral exports from the US to partner countries (and vice
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Note: agricultural (manufacturing) productivity is measured by weighting US total exports of agricultural (manufac-
turing) products by share of workers in a given industry/district. Sources: Comtrade and QCEW.
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Note: agricultural (manufacturing) productivity is measured by weighting partner countries total exports of agricul-
tural (manufacturing) products by GDP in agriculture (manufacturing). Sources: Comtrade and WDI.
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Agri CA
Note: Agri CA is a measure of comparative advantage in agriculture using crop suitability. Agri CA1 is a measure of
comparative advantage in agriculture using crop suitability divided by a measure of relative efficiency in manufacturing
using export data weighted by share for workers in each industry and district.
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Note: Agri CA is a measure of comparative advantage in agriculture using crop suitability. Agri CA2 is a measure of
comparative advantage in agriculture using export data weighted by share for workers in each industry and district
divided by a measure of relative efficiency in manufacturing using export data weighted by share for workers in each
industry and district.
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Figure B6: Agricultural Comparative Advantage by US District
Geographical distribution of 
 comparative advantage as measured  
 by population−standardized ratio of 
 sums for crops that face tariff cuts
Deciles: 
 Comparative advantage 












Note: The figure shows the sum of the AgriCA1dp measure across all PTAs ratified between 1993 and 2012. The
figure illustrates the decile each district belongs to in the distribution of this variable. Source: FAO-GAEZ.
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Figure B8: Share of yes Votes for PTAs by US District







Map of 'Yes' votes
Note: The figure shows the share of yes votes by legislators across all PTAs ratified between 1993 and 2012. The
figure illustrates the quartile each district belongs to in the distribution of this variable. Sources: FAO-GAEZ and
GovTrack.
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Table B1: Descriptive Statistics (Main)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Agri CA 7,708 1.03 3.10 -9.21 11.66
Agri CA1 7,397 5.13 3.76 -7.81 15.94
Agri CA2 7,346 -0.97 3.50 -10.57 13.96
Offshorable 7,520 27.92 8.04 6.02 44.49
Democratic Legislators 7,708 0.48 0.50 0 1
Manufacturing Employment 7,395 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.43
Manufactruing Profit 6,543 0.06 0.07 0.001 0.53
Occupation in Agri 7,526 231.75 331.60 3.51 4432.87
Population Density 7,397 1817.84 5032.31 9.80 42534.19
ID district 7,708 223 129 1 447
Decade 7,708 2001 5 1990 2010
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Table B2: Descriptive Statistics (ANES)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Favor Free Trade 5548 1.37 0.48 0 1
Agri CA 5548 1.10 2.31 -9.21 6.29
Agri CA1 5548 5.92 2.47 -5.03 12.04
Agri CA2 5548 -0.10 2.53 -8.03 7.32
Democratic Legislators 5548 0.49 0.48 0 1
Offshorable 5548 27.32 8.49 6.31 44.49
Gender 5548 1.45 0.50 0 1
Education 5548 4.78 1.57 1 7
Ideology 5548 5.85 2.41 0 10
Age 5548 51 16 17 92
ID district 5548 214 127 1 427




Text analysis on legislators speeches Transcripts of House floor debates preceding roll-call
votes on free trade agreements were obtained directly from the Congressional Record of Proceedings
and Debates of the United States Congress. For each bill other than NAFTA, web addresses were
collected for digitized versions of the Congressional Record containing the debate on FTA imple-
mentation acts. In some cases debate exceeds the two hours of time allotted to a bill, postponing
further debate and an eventual vote to later congressional proceedings. When this is the case, all
URLs relevant to the implementation act of a particular FTA were collected.
Using the rvest package for R, the html of the relevant pages of the digitized congressional
record was scraped. Text was extracted from the html of each webpage, and this was then cleaned
to contain only the debate, removing procedures to introduce the bill, the reading of the bill, and
the vote on the bill.
In the case of H.R. 3450 (103rd): North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act,
debate transcript had to be manually extracted from a PDF version of the Congressional Record,
as digitization only began in 1995. This is the only bill for which the debate transcript is not
web-scraped.
After debate transcripts were obtained, and concatenated where multiple sessions preceded vot-
ing on a single bill, texts were then processed to link statements with members of the House of
Representatives. Because of the standard format of the Congressional Record, which begins each
statement with the upper-case surname of the speaking representative, this process is straightfor-
ward. To obtain full speeches by each representative for each bill individual statements were then
combined into a single long string of text.
Statements were then automatically coded for mentions of agriculture by counting the number of
times the character strings agri or farm appeared in the text. Once FTA-representative level counts
were obtained, these were manually reviewed to determine if uses of the terms were in support of
the FTA, against the FTA, or not germane to the question, in order to construct two variables at
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the FTA-representative level: one which is a count of mentions of agri or farm in support of the
agreement, and one count of those against.
Examples of statements which match with the terms mentioned above, and which were coded
as in support of the agreement, include the following partial quotes:
From Representative Herger on CAFTA:
Mr. Speaker, I represent one of the richest agricultural districts in the world in Northern
California, in the northern Sacramento Valley. And this CAFTA agreement will create
important new export opportunities for the Northern California farmers and ranchers I
represent.
From Representative Smith of Nebraska on the US-PERU FTA:
I rise today in support of expanding our Nations export markets by passing the bi-
partisan Peru Trade Promotion Agreement. The agreement will create significant new
opportunities for American farmers, ranchers, businesses and certainly consumers by
opening new markets and reducing trade barriers, leveling that playing field. More
than two-thirds of current U.S. farm exports to Peru will become duty free immedi-
ately. This trade agreement gives U.S. farmers an advantage over competitors. For
example, U.S. exporters of wheat and white corn currently pay a 17% tariff in Peru,
while Argentina pays only 3.4% and controls two-thirds of Perus market.
As our outcome is a count for the statement, the first would record two mentions, the first of
agri and the second of farm. The second quote would record three mentions, all of farm, and in
each case in support of the agreement.
Examples of statements made against agreements which match these terms include the following:
From Representative Costa on CAFTA:
Mr. Speaker, I fully support global commerce. Almonds, which I grow on my land in
Fresno, have become one of Californias most valuable exports through development of
foreign markets. In fact, more than two-thirds of this $1 billion a year crop is shipped
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outside of the United States every year. So, I truly understand the benefit of opening the
world to the abundance of U.S. products. Of the producers in my district, some will win
and some will lose with CAFTA. I am here to speak on behalf of Americas best interest.
That interest is a trade policy that is free and, more importantly, fair. Unfortunately,
regardless of the diligent work and excellent intentions of our trade negotiators, the
bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements we have entered into are not serving America
well, especially not American agriculture, if you use the last 10 years of increasing trade
deficit as the standard [...]. In light of our trade deficits, how can we approve another
agreement and expect different, better results for the American farmer? In conclusion,
my vote today against CAFTA is a vote of protest, a vote of dissatisfaction, a line in
the sand. My nay vote today is a message on behalf of American agriculture, American
businesses, and American workers to the administration and my colleagues in Congress
that we absolutely must develop a new trade strategy, a strategy that reverses, over
time, our trade deficit. This new trade strategy must be straight with the American
public. It must define whoover the next 10, or 20, or 30 yearswill be the winners and
losers. Because, for America to be economically strong in the 21st century, we must have
a plan to address the transitions and shifts in our domestic economy. As participants
in the 21st century economy that Thomas Friedman refers to as the new flat earth,’
American workers and businessmen deserve to know what their chances are in the global
economy. They need to know who among them will be the winners and losers. And,
throughout that deliberation, American agriculture must have a seat at the table.
From Representative Carson of Oklahoma, on the US-Australia FTA:
Mr. Speaker, today unfortunately, I rise to voice my opposition to this trade agreement.
I do feel that trade is essential to Americas sustained economic vitality and I also feel
that we must make every effort to ensure that international markets are open to U.S.
goods. Exports have accounted for almost 30% of American growth over the last decade.
In fact, my state of Oklahoma sold more than $3 billion worth of exports to more than
100 foreign markets last year. With these statistics in mind, it pains me to vote against
this agreement. When casting my vote, I must think of the many Oklahoma farmers
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and ranchers that I have spoken with about this agreement and I must take into consid-
eration how this agreement will severely cripple their ability to support themselves and
their families. In particular, the provisions of this agreement will unfairly disadvantage
the beef and wheat industries, which comprise two-thirds of Oklahomas agricultural
exports. This agreement would allow increased quantities of Australian beef to flood
the U.S. market, which will result in unacceptably low market prices for American cat-
tlemen. In Oklahoma alone, more than 105,000 jobs associated with the cattle industry
will be put in jeopardy by the adverse effects of this agreement. In addition to the beef
industry, the continued existence of the Australian Wheat Board under this agreement
will force Americas wheat farmers to continue their export competition in the interna-
tional markets against a state run monopoly. A government backed monopoly, like the
Australian Wheat Board, which dictates the price of wheat rather than allowing the
free market to take its course, thereby allows Australian wheat to consistently undercut
the price of American wheat in international markets. Once again, American farmers
must be able to sell their products if they are going to support themselves and their
families. This agreement does not afford them that opportunity.
In the same manner as those statements made in support of the agreement, the count of those
mentions against the agreement in both of these speeches would be four. The first speech mentions
agri three times, and farm’ once, while the latter mentions agri once and farm three times.
Last, some speeches mention the terms, but not in a way that clearly supports or opposes the
agreement in question. For example, on the US-Chile FTA, Representative Frank of Massachusetts
begins with the following:
Mr. Speaker, first I do want to comment on the irony of many of us being lectured
about the value of free trade by supporters of the most anti-free trade, anti-poor people
policy that the United States has, our agriculture policy. People who have voted for the
American agriculture bill have less credentials to preach to the rest of us about being
fair to poor people than anyone I can think of.
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Though Representative Frank goes on to explain his opposition to the FTA, he does not again
make recourse to agriculture. Thus the count for this segment of text is zero for both of our
variables.
We divide the positive count variables for the full length of the speech and we use it as outcome.
We include bill fixed effects, Democratic Legislators, and Offshoring and run OLS regressions with
standard errors clustered by district. Note that we are unable to run a Heckman model to account
for the selection into speaking about the bill, since we have a limited number of observations in
the outcome equation and the Heckman model does not converge. As such, the estimates should
be interpreted as local average effects, since the sample is made by only these legislators who have
spoken during floor debates preceding roll-call votes on PTAs. More formally, we estimate the
following model:
PTAs Good Agridp = ηb + β0 + β1Agri CAdp + β2Democratsdp + β3Offshorabledp + ǫdp, (1)
where PTAs Good Agridp is the ratio between the number of times that a legislator mentions that
PTAs are good for farmers and the full length of the speech. We observe this outcome at the level
of the district d for a partner country p. Agri CAdp is our measure of the comparative advantage
in agricultural production of district d with respect to partner country p. ηb are bill fixed effects,
which control for and net out time-invariant differences across PTA bills. β0 is a constant, β1,
β2, and β3 are the variable coefficients and ǫdp accounts for all the residual determinants of the
outcome.
Results are reported in Table C1. Both measures of comparative advantage (solo measure and
ratio) have a positive coefficient, which is significant. In sum, there is evidence that legislators in
districts with high comparative advantage in agriculture make explicit connections between trade
liberalization of agricultural products and benefits for the farming community they represent.
Individual attitude towards free trade We rely on the ANES survey, which has been regularly
administrated to US citizens since the 1990s. The survey is particularly useful for us for a couple
of reasons. First, it includes a question on support for free trade in most of the waves. Second,
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Table C1: Legislators Speeches Mentioning that PTAs are Good for Agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agri CA 0.0003*** 0.0002**
(0.000) (0.000)
Agri CA1 0.0002*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Agri CA2 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.0012*** 0.0006*** 0.0018*** 0.0037** 0.0032* 0.0038**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 869 826 825 840 826 825
R-squared 0.034 0.028 0.031 0.063 0.059 0.061
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
OLS
PTAs Good for Agric.
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district-
partner country. The outcome variable counts the number of times that a legislator in district d mentions that PTAs
are good for the agricultural sector of the district in their declaration of vote for a specific PTA. This count variable
is divided by the length of the speech. The key independent variables are measures of comparative advantage in
agriculture, which vary by district and partner country. Sources: Comtrade, FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, IPUMS, and
QCEW.
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it reports the district in which respondents live, which allows us to match survey data to our
comparative advantage measures.
Unfortunately, the survey contains a question on the support for free trade agreement, but only
in 2016, which is of no use for our analysis. The assumption that we make is that in assessing their
support for free trade, respondents have in mind costs and benefits generated by trade agreements.
This assumption seems plausible, since PTAs are the most important piece of trade policy since
the 1990s, widely discussed in the media and thoroughly scrutinized by trade union, business
associations, etc.
We use the 1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 waves. We did not use the 2000 wave, since the
US signed a PTA only with Jordan between 1996 and 1999 and there is no voting record for this
PTA. If we include the 2000 wave the results are unchanged. We include the 2016 wave since we
have PTAs ratified in 2012, which are not included in the 2012 wave to avoid post-treatment bias.
This is because we do not know the exact day on which respondents answered the survey in 2012.
We run a model in which the outcome scoring is one if respondents support free trade; zero,
otherwise. Our main independent variables are our measures of comparative advantage. We also
include district and wave fixed effects, our two controls, and some individual-level controls (age,
education, gender, and ideology). Note that our unit of analysis is district-wave in this test. Our
measure of comparative advantage varies across waves, since the US signs PTAs with different
partner countries in each wave. More formally, we estimate the following model:





where Support Free Tradeidw is a dummy equal to one if the respondent i from district d supports
free trade in wave w. Agri CAdw is our measure of the comparative advantage in agricultural
production of district d in wave w. αd are district fixed effects, which control for and net out time-
invariant differences across districts, and γw are wave fixed effects, which absorb the overall trends
in legislators votes. Democratsdw and Offshorabledw are the two main controls at the district level.
Xiw is a vector with individual level controls, i.e. age, education, gender, and ideology.
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β0 is a constant, β1, β2, β3, and ζ4 are the variable coefficients and ǫidw accounts for all the
residual determinants of the outcome. Note that because Agri CAdw is specific to each district
and each wave, we use variation both across districts and within districts across waves to identify
the parameter of interest β1. We cluster robust standard errors by district.
Table C2 shows the result of this test. Both measures of comparative advantage (solo measure
and ratio) have a positive coefficient, which is significant. Thus, respondents living in districts with
high comparative advantage are more likely to support free trade. This is an important result,
which allows us to link legislators voting to the preferences of the community that they represent.
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Table C2: Support for Free Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Agri CA 0.0298*** 0.0328*** 0.0280**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Agri CA1 0.0340*** 0.0353*** 0.0296**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Agri CA2 0.0045 0.0035 0.0069
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 1.1150*** 0.9054*** 1.1384*** 1.1449*** 0.9268*** 1.1658*** 1.2621*** 1.0794*** 1.2730***
(0.027) (0.082) (0.027) (0.034) (0.084) (0.036) (0.053) (0.098) (0.053)
Observations 6,467 6,467 6,467 6,467 6,467 6,467 5,548 5,548 5,548
R-squared 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.112 0.111 0.167 0.167 0.167
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
OLS
Support For Trade
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district-survey wave. The outcome variable is scored
one if respondents oppose limits to imports from other countries to the US. The key independent variables are measures of comparative advantage in agriculture,




We perform the following robustness checks:
• Results are not sensitive to log transformation (Table D1);
• Results hold if we take into account the fact that different crops command different prices by
multiplying absolute suitability by the price of each crop (Costinot et al. 2016) (Table D2);
• Results are similar if we take the sum of the ratios for each crop rather than the ratio of the
sum across all crops (Table D3);
• Results of Agri CA1 and Agri CA2 hold even if we use other model specifications, including
the one in which we add all the additional controls (Tables D4 and D4);
• Results hold even if we take into account the service sector (Tables D6 and D7);
• Results hold if we account for the China shock (Table D8);
• Results hold if we rely on logistic regressions (Table D9);
• Results are similar though weaker when we explore legislators voting in the Senate (Table
D10);
• We build a placebo that captures comparative advantage for crops excluded from PTAs. This
variable has no effect on the outcome, implying that legislators are well aware of the design
of trade agreements (Table D11).
Alternative Measures of Comparative Advantage
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Table D1: Comparative Advantage (No Log) and Legislators Vote for PTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agri CA 0.000009*** 0.000005*** 0.000006*** 0.000005*** 0.000005***





Constant 0.595165*** 0.996508*** 0.943896*** 1.011776*** 1.144924*** 1.010596*** 1.014793***
(0.017) (0.001) (0.023) (0.033) (0.273) (0.034) (0.034)
Observations 7,708 7,708 7,708 7,520 6,543 7,397 7,346
R-squared 0.004 0.552 0.556 0.591 0.643 0.594 0.595
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No Yes No No
OLS
Legislators' Voting in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is district-partner country. The outcome variable scores one
if a legislator in district d votes in favor of PTA j. The key independent variable is a measure of comparative advantage, which varies by district and partner
country. Sources: FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, and IPUMS.
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Table D2: Comparative Advantage (Weighted on Prices) and Legislators Vote for PTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agri CA (weighted on prices) 0.04** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.61** 0.98** 0.93** 1.00** 0.98** 1.00**
(0.016) (0.004) (0.022) (0.034) (0.026) (0.034)
District fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,001 6,001 6,001 5,861 5,861 5,861
R-squared 0.045 0.539 0.543 0.586 0.585 0.586
OLS
Legislators' Vote in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is district-partner
country. The outcome variable scores one if a legislator in district d votes in favor of PTA j. The key independent
variable is a measure of comparative advantage weighted on prices, which varies by district and partner country.
Sources: FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, and IPUMS.
Table D3: Comparative Advantage (Sum of Ratios) and Legislators Vote for PTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agri CA (sum of ratios) 0.02** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.45** 0.95** 0.92** 0.98** 0.96** 0.98**
(0.024) (0.014) (0.025) (0.035) (0.028) (0.035)
District fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,708 7,708 7,708 7,520 7,520 7,520
R-squared 0.030 0.552 0.555 0.591 0.590 0.591
OLS
Legislators' Vote in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is district-partner
country. The outcome variable scores one if a legislator in district d votes in favor of PTA j. The key independent
variable is a measure of comparative advantage built as sum of ratios, which varies by district and partner country.
Sources: FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, and IPUMS.
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Table D4: AgriCA1 and PTA Voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agri CA2 0.026*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.467*** 0.917*** 0.868*** 0.937*** 0.978***
(0.023) (0.011) (0.023) (0.034) (0.272)
Observations 7,397 7,397 7,397 7,397 6,543
R-squared 0.039 0.559 0.562 0.600 0.648
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No Yes
OLS
Legislators' Voting in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district-
partner country. The outcome variable scores one if a legislator in district d votes in favor of PTA j. The key
independent variable is the ratio between comparative advantage in agriculture and in manufacturing, which varies
by district and partner country. Sources: Comtrade, FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, IPUMS, and QCEW.
31
Table D5: AgriCA2 and PTA Voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agri CA2 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.610*** 1.004*** 0.942*** 1.007*** 1.102***
(0.017) (0.001) (0.023) (0.033) (0.279)
Observations 7,346 7,346 7,346 7,346 6,492
R-squared 0.009 0.554 0.557 0.596 0.644
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No Yes
OLS
Legislators' Voting in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district-
partner country. The outcome variable scores one if a legislator in district d votes in favor of PTA j. The key
independent variable is the ratio between comparative advantage in agriculture and in manufacturing, which varies
by district and partner country. Sources: Comtrade, FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, IPUMS, and QCEW.
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Table D6: AgriCAS1 and PTA Voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agri CAS1 0.034*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.568*** 0.956*** 0.935*** 1.005*** 1.043***
(0.017) (0.005) (0.023) (0.033) (0.271)
Observations 7,397 7,397 7,397 7,397 6,543
R-squared 0.049 0.559 0.561 0.598 0.647
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No Yes
OLS
Legislators' Voting in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district-
partner country. The outcome variable scores one if a legislator in district d votes in favor of PTA j. The key
independent variable is the ratio between comparative advantage in agriculture and in services, which varies by
district and partner country. Sources: Comtrade, FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, IPUMS, and QCEW.
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Table D7: AgriCAS2 and PTA Voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agri CAS2 0.017*** 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.686*** 1.004*** 0.950*** 1.009*** 1.155***
(0.028) (0.009) (0.025) (0.035) (0.274)
Observations 7,346 7,346 7,346 7,346 6,492
R-squared 0.010 0.553 0.556 0.595 0.644
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No Yes
OLS
Legislators' Voting in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district-
partner country. The outcome variable scores one if a legislator in district d votes in favor of PTA j. The key
independent variable is the ratio between comparative advantage in agriculture and in services, which varies by
district and partner country. Sources: Comtrade, FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, IPUMS, and QCEW.
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Accounting for the China Shock
A possible concern is that our measure of comparative advantage in agriculture correlates with the
presence/absence of other industries which are also affected by PTAs.12
Remember that the China shock variable is a Bartik measure capturing rising Chinese imports
to the United States in each industry i weighted by baseline share of workers in the same industry
i in each commuting zone. This variable varies both across CZs and over time, i.e. pre- and
post-China accession to the WTO. This variable is instrumented using import from China to other
high-income countries (weighted on share of workers as well). The two trade flows (imports from
China to the US and from China to other high-income countries) are highly correlated due to
Chinas rising comparative advantage and falling trade costs.
To explore whether a correlation between comparative advantage in agriculture and manufac-
turing production may drive our results, we rely on the same model specification as in Feigenbaum
and Hall (2015). The results are reported in Table 2. In columns 1 and 2, we run both OLS and
2SLS, instrumenting the China Shock variable as in Autor et al. (2013). In columns 3 and 4, we
include our two controls: Democrats and Offshoring. In columns 5 and 6, we also add district fixed
effects.13
All the results validate our previous findings. Specifically, the three measures of agriculture
comparative advantage remain positive and significant in every model. Moreover, the coefficient of
China Shock is negative and significant in every model except Model 3, confirming the results of
Feigenbaum and Hall (2015).
12For instance, Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) show that districts affected by the China shock, i.e. the dramatic
surge in imports to the US following Chinas entry into the WTO, are significantly less likely to vote in favor of trade
liberalization agreements than districts not affected by the China shock.
13Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) do not include district fixed effects since they rely on double first-difference models,
i.e. first differences of both the outcome and China Shock, which is equivalent to including district fixed effects.
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Table D8: Comparative Advantage, the China Shock and Legislators Votes on PTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Agri CA 0.03491*** 0.03554*** 0.01161*** 0.01315*** 0.01543*** 0.01539***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Agri CA1 0.01147*** 0.01145***
(0.002) (0.002)
Agri CA2 0.00531*** 0.00535***
(0.001) (0.001)
China Shock -0.02006** -0.03326** -0.01101 -0.03170*** -0.04052** -0.07560* -0.04096** -0.07543* -0.04264** -0.07909*
(0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.020) (0.044) (0.020) (0.044) (0.020) (0.044)
Constant 0.60218*** 0.61827*** 0.90053*** 0.90686*** 1.04499*** 0.98036*** 1.05046***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Observations 7,634 7,634 7,446 7,446 7,446 7,446 7,359 7,359 7,308 7,308
R-squared 0.051 0.049 0.373 0.370 0.597 0.107 0.601 0.107 0.598 0.097
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legislators' Voting in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS and 2SLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district-partner country. The outcome
variable scores one if the legislator from district d votes in favor of PTA j. The key independent variables are measures of comparative advantage, which vary
by district and partner country. China Shock is instrumented using the same identification strategy as in Autor et al. (2013). Sources: Autor et al. (2013),
FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, and IPUMS.
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Logit Regressions
Table D9: Main Analysis Using Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agri CA 0.150*** 0.166*** 0.158*** 0.168*** 0.188***






(0.073) (1.002) (1.021) (1.046) (5.972) (1.051) (1.046)
Observations 7,708 5,189 5,189 5,109 3,609 4,986 4,935
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No Yes No No
OLS
Legislators' Voting in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: logit with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district-
partner country. The outcome variable scores one if a legislator in district d votes in favor of PTA j. The key
independent variables are measures of comparative advantage in agriculture, which vary by district and partner
country. Sources: Comtrade, FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, IPUMS, and QCEW.
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Analysis of the Senate
We run our main models for the Senate. Table D10 shows that, while the coefficient remains
positive, it is only significant when accounting for relative efficiency in manufacturing. To us the
weaker significance is the result of a smaller variation in both the outcome variable and our measure
of comparative advantage in agriculture, since the analysis is at the state-partner country level for
the Senate. These results are in line with previous studies pointing out that the heterogeneity of
the district electorate matters for trade policy (Bailey, 2001; Bailey and Brady, 1998).
Table D10: Main Analysis (Senate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agri CA 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001





Constant 0.497*** 0.687*** 0.691*** 0.748*** -15.073*** 0.728*** 0.712***
(0.046) (0.001) (0.070) (0.103) (3.821) (0.101) (0.102)
Observations 798 798 798 798 602 798 798
R-squared 0.022 0.448 0.455 0.470 0.548 0.472 0.473
State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No Yes No No
OLS
Legislators' Voting in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. The unit of observation is the state-partner
country. The outcome variable scores one if a legislator in state d votes in favor of PTA j. The key independent
variables are measures of comparative advantage in agriculture, which vary by state and partner country. Sources:
Comtrade, FAO-GAEZ, GovTrack, IPUMS, and QCEW.
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Placebo
Table D11: Comparative Advantage in Agriculture with Crops both Included and Excluded from
PTAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agri CA 0.036*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015***





Agri CA excluded crops -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Agri CA1 excluded crops -0.000
(0.000)
Agri CA2 excluded crops -0.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.563*** 0.953*** 1.000*** 0.960*** 1.038*** 0.884*** 0.996***
(0.019) (0.006) (0.013) (0.096) (0.271) (0.099) (0.033)
Observations 6,842 6,842 6,842 6,654 6,543 6,543 6,927
R-squared 0.048 0.616 0.618 0.641 0.647 0.647 0.591
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No No Yes No No
OLS
Legislators' Voting in Favor of PTAs
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS with robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district-
partner country. The outcome variable scores one if a legislator in district d votes in favor of PTA j. The key
independent variables are measures of comparative advantage in agriculture for crops both included and excluded




Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2013. “The China syndrome: Local labor
market effects of import competition in the United States.” American Economic Review 103(6):
2121-68.
Bailey, Michael. 2001. “Quiet influence: The representation of diffuse interests on trade policy,
1983-94.” Legislative Studies Quarterly : 45-80.
Bailey, Michael, and David W. Brady. 1998. “Heterogeneity and representation: The Senate and
free trade.” American Journal of Political Science: 524-544.
40
